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*AMENDED BLD-046      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2515 
___________ 
 
RAMSEY RANDALL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FACEBOOK, INC., SUPERVISORY LIABILITY; 
FOX NEWS AND ENTERTAINMENT, INC., SUPERVISORY LIABILITY;  
GOOGLE, INC., CORPORATE ENTITY, SUPERVISORY LIABILITY;  
READING EAGLE COMPANY, Supervisory Liability; DISTRICT ATTORNEY JOHN 
ADAMS, ESQ. IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; WEST 
READING POLICE DEPARTMENT; JOSEPH M. BROWN, CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATOR, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES;  
KARIE GOOD, Police Officer, IN HER OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; 
BERKS COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA (TOWNSHIP), IN ITS OFFICIAL/INDIVIDUAL 
CAPACITY VIA MUNICIPAL LIABILITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-17-cv-01526) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 9, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, RESTREPO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 30, 2017) 
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_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
Ramsey Randall, proceeding pro se, appeals the order of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  
According to Randall’s complaint, on May 14, 2015, Randall was arrested in 
Berks County, Pennsylvania, and charged with offenses relating to organized crime.  
Randall alleged that this prosecution was in retaliation for a civil complaint that he had 
filed against the local municipality.  Over the next few weeks, the local media reported 
about the prosecution and called Randall a gang member involved with the “Sixth Ward 
Organization.”  This information was also promulgated on social media and internet 
search engines.  The prosecutor eventually withdrew the organized crime charge against 
Randall, but Randall was convicted of related charges. 
Following his conviction, Randall filed a civil rights complaint in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  Randall named (1) Berks County, the West Reading Police 
Department, District Attorney John Adams, Detective Joseph Brown, Police Officer 
Karie Good (“the municipal defendants”), and (2) the Reading Eagle Newspaper 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Company, Fox News & Entertainment, Inc., Google, Inc., and Facebook, Inc. (“the media 
defendants”).  Randall alleged that the municipal defendants had violated his First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by unlawfully prosecuting and defaming him.  As relief, 
Randall sought to have his convictions vacated, an order that a property in California 
named “La Palace Royal” be purchased and provided to him, and $100 million in 
damages.  Randall further alleged that the media defendants had committed the state law 
torts of defamation and placing him in a false light.  From the media defendants, Randall 
sought a broadcast apology interview, to have his Facebook page unfrozen, a non-
disclosure meeting with Mark Zuckerberg, to have the any defamatory information 
removed from search engines, and several hundred million dollars in damages.  Randall 
also sought injunctive relief. 
 The District Court dismissed the complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to 
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Randall filed an amended 
complaint raising the same claims.  The District Court again dismissed the action for 
failure to state a claim.  Randall filed a motion for reconsideration and a request for a 
default judgment, both of which were denied.  Randall appeals.1  
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is plenary.  See Allah v. 
                                              
1 Randall has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel.  
 
2 Randall filed a timely amended notice of appeal from the denial of reconsideration, as is 
required by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the 
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Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We review the District Court’s denial of 
the Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, 
Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).   Pro se complaints must be construed 
liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and we accept the factual 
allegations contained in the complaint as true.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
572 (2007).  Where a complaint has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief 
that is “plausible on its face[,]” dismissal is appropriate.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009).   
 Dismissal of Randall’s claim that he was defamed by the municipal defendants 
was appropriate.  As the District Court explained, an individual does not have a protected 
interest in reputation alone.  Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 297 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).  Instead, “defamation is actionable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if it occurs in the course of or is accompanied by a change 
or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by state law or the Constitution.”  Clark 
v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-12).  
Accordingly, a plaintiff must plead a “stigma-plus” claim in his complaint.  See Hill v. 
Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “to make out a 
due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation, a plaintiff must show 
a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or interest”).  
                                                                                                                                                  
denial of reconsideration.  Cf. United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
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Randall asserted that the press release defamed him and limited his prospects for 
employment as a musician.  Randall’s claim is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Paul v. Davis.  There, the Court stated that a claim of defamation (by a police 
department that circulated a flyer imputing criminal behavior to a person) was not a 
federal claim even if it would “seriously impair [that person’s] future employment 
opportunities.”  Paul, 424 U.S. at 697.  Accordingly, Randall’s complaint failed to state a 
“stigma-plus” claim, and the District Court was correct in dismissing it.   
The District Court properly dismissed the claims against Berks County as Randall 
failed to allege any constitutional violation attributable to a Berks County custom or 
policy.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that 
Section 1983 liability attaches to a municipality only where the “government’s policy or 
custom… inflicts the injury”).  To the extent Randall identified Berks County’s policy as 
failing to train and supervise District Attorney John Adams, this vague and conclusory 
allegation is insufficient to state a claim.  Cf. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 
628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding “vague assertions” of policy or custom were insufficient 
to impose liability).   
Randall also raised a claim that his conviction was unconstitutional.  We agree 
with the District Court that dismissal of Randall’s claim seeking immediate release from 
his incarceration was appropriate because he may seek that relief only in a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).  However, 
Randall also argued that his conviction was unconstitutional because he was criminally 
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prosecuted in retaliation for filing a civil action against the municipality.  The District 
Court concluded that this claim was barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which requires proof that a conviction has been invalidated.  
Randall alleged that the charge relating to organized crime was withdrawn by the 
prosecutor, but he admitted that he was convicted of several related charges.   
Because Randall was not convicted of all of the charges, he might be able to meet 
the favorable termination requirement.  See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 188 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc).  In Hilfirty v. Shipman, we explained that a nolle prosequi 
disposition is a favorable termination unless the accused has entered into a compromise 
or surrendered something of value to obtain that outcome.  91 F.3d 573, 575, 580 (3d Cir. 
1996).  There is no evidence that the prosecutor withdrew the organized crime charge 
based on a compromise or negotiation.  Thus, Randall may have pleaded a claim for 
retaliatory prosecution that is not barred by Heck.   
Nevertheless, we may affirm on any ground apparent in the record.  See Hughes v. 
Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).  District Attorney John Adams is absolutely 
immune from liability for his decision to prosecute.  See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 
250, 261-62 (2006).  To the extent that Randall raised this claim against any of the other 
defendants, he has not plausibly pleaded any adverse actions by the remaining defendants 
based on his lawsuit.  Accordingly, Randall failed to state a claim for retaliatory 
prosecution.  
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Because no federal claim was actionable, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to entertain Randall’s state law claim for defamation or Randall’s 
state law claims for defamation asserted against defendants in their individual capacity.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  Likewise, the District Court did not err when it dismissed 
the complaint without providing leave to amend, as Randall had previously been 
permitted to amend his complaint after being advised of the foregoing defects.  See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that leave 
to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile).  Finally, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Randall’s motion for reconsideration.  
Reconsideration is warranted if a litigant shows “(1) an intervening change in the 
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court 
[ruled]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest 
injustice.”  Max’s Seafood Café,176 F.3d at 677 (citation omitted).  As the District Court 
concluded, Randall did not establish any basis for reconsideration. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  Randall’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. 
